








A merging function synthesizes a vector of numbers (representing measurements, scores or quantitative
opinions) into a single number (representing a consensus or collective measurement, score or quantitative
opinion). Assuming that all the involved numbers are drawn from a discrete set, it is shown that projection
functions are the only merging functions satisfying three properties satisfied by the arithmetic mean (defined
for real numbers). Another projection result is obtained under alternative assumptions when merging
functions are assumed to transform matrices of numbers from a discrete set to a vector of numbers from the
discrete set.
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1. Introduction
A general formal problem considered in many disciplines consists of associating a unique
number with an ordered set of numbers, so that the number integrates, summarizes,
synthesizes, represents, aggregates or merges the numbers from the ordered set. The
procedures accomplishing this task are called “merging functions” in Aczél and Roberts
(1989).
The archetypal merging functions are probably those generating some form of mean value:
the arithmetic mean, the weighted arithmetic mean, the geometric mean, the weighted
geometric mean… Conditions under which merging functions of this sort arise can be
found in  Aczél (1966, pp. 234-240), Aczél and Saaty (1983) and Aczél and Roberts (1989,
pp. 236-241).
There are nonetheless cases in which it is not possible to resort to mean values. This may
occur when the merging function has to select its output from a discrete set, because, for
instance, the numbers to be aggregated are measured in terms of an indivisible unit (Euro
Cents or persons) or are used as a device to name objects or options (in which case merging
function are procedures to select the objects or options).
This paper is motivated by the problem of aggregating measurements, scores, data or
quantitative opinions when the inputs and output of merging functions belong to a discrete
set. The two main results (Propositions 2.4 and 3.6) make evident the difficulties of
obtaining a reasonable merging procedure that satisfies certain plausible requirements: in
both cases, under the interpretation that individuals provide the data to be merged, the only
admissible type of merging procedure consists of selecting one of the individuals and let the
aggregation be determined by that individual. In other words, the merging functions must
be projection functions. In the social choice literature, this kind of result is interpreted as a
dictatorial result, since the collective measurement, score or opinion always coincides with
the measurement, score or opinion of a given individual.
The results are obtained in two different but related settings. In the first one (Section 2),
merging functions as defined above are considered and it is shown that only projection
functions satisfy three apparently plausible conditions. First, agreement: merging the same
score must yield that score as output. Second, monotonicity: if no score is lowered then the
score generated by the merging function does not decrease. And third, a property of-3-
independence: if, starting from certain scores, a certain change in the scores does not alter
the summarizing score then, no matter from which scores one starts, the effect of those
changes on the summarizing score is null.
The second setting (Section 3) deals with the case in which the n individuals do not report a
single measurement, score or quantitative opinion but a vector of such values, each value
being a measurement, score or quantitative opinion referred to a different object from a
given set of m objects. If the merging procedures in Section 2 deal with the transformation
of 1 ´ n vectors into numbers, the merging procedures in Section 3 deal simultaneously
with m such transformations, so that they map an m ´ n vector into an m ´ 1 vector (the
entries in the output vector representing the collective score attributed to the m objects). It
is shown that only projection functions satisfy the following three conditions.
First, an allocation condition according to which all the individual score vectors as well as
the collective score vector must distribute a total score c among all the objects. This
condition makes sense, for example, when scores are proportions or when the underlying
problem is just one of allocating a certain amount among the objects (which can then be
viewed as tasks). Second, a decentralization condition establishing that the aggregation
takes place object by object: to compute the score of an object the only information that is
relevant is given by the scores individuals ascribe to the object. And third, a bound
condition stating that the collective score of an object cannot be greater than the maximum
score that some individual assigns to the object.
On the one hand, Proposition 2.4 appears to alert us to the danger of presuming the
existence of satisfactory aggregation procedures without properly specifying the domain
over which the aggregation takes place. In Economics, for instance, variables (like
production or prices) typically range over a continuum, though the conceptually correct
choice seems to be that they should range over a discrete set. In this respect, Proposition 2.4
may suggest that aggregation problems in that context could create more inconveniences
than expected. On the other hand, the message of Proposition 3.6 perhaps lies in stressing
the difficulties of trying to reduce one type of aggregation problems to simpler aggregation
problems when some connection exists between the parts of the main aggregation problem.
This reading connects Proposition 3.6 to one of the reference results in social choice theory,
Arrow’s (1963, p. 97) theorem.-4-
2. Merging measurements of a single object
Let N = {1, … , n} be a finite subset of the set of natural numbers, with n ³ 2, and D a
subset of the set Z of integers having at least three members and being closed in the
following sense: for all x Î Z, y Î Z\{x} and z Î Z\{x, y}, if x Î D, y Î D\{x} and x < z < y
then z Î D. A merging function is a mapping f : Dn ® D.
The general interpretation is: (i) that there is some underlying object having a measurable
property; (ii) that D defines the set of possible values of the measurements; (iii) that n
measures (x1, … , xn) Î Dn have been obtained; and (iv) that f represents a procedure to
obtain a representative measure f(x1, … , xn). In more specific contexts, members of N may
designate individuals, members of D quantitative opinions about some issue (for instance,
utility values associated with some collective decision) and f yield a “social” opinion or a
“consensus” value.
For x Î D and y Î D\{x}, the expression “x covers y” means “y < x and there is no integer z
such that y < z < x”. For i Î N and x = (x1, … , xn) Î Dn, xi designates the ith component of
x. For i Î N, x Î D, y Î D\{x} and x Î Dn: (i) (xi, y-i) denotes the member x of Dn such
that xi = x and, for all j Î N\{i}, xj = y; and (ii) (xi, x-i) denotes the member z of Dn such
that zi = x and, for all j Î N\{i}, zj = xj. The aim of this section is to characterize the set of
merging functions satisfying the three conditions stated next.
A1. For all x Î D, f(x, … , x) = x.
A1 is the agreement assumption in Aczél and Roberts (1989, p. 218). The interpretation
according to which merging functions are rules to integrate measurements into one
representative measurement makes A1 a plausible requirement: if all the measurements are
equal to a certain value x, which is the best summarizing measurement but x itself?
A2. For all a, b, g Î Dn, if f(a) = f(b) and, for all i Î N, gi ³ ai then f(g) ³ f(b).
A2 is a monotonicity property: if f yields the same value for two measurement profiles then,
every change that does not decrease any value in one of the profiles, cannot induce f to
yield a value smaller than the value that corresponds to the other profile. This establishes a
requirement of non-negative response: increasing the values to be merged cannot reduce the
resulting merged value.-5-
A3. For all a, b, g, d Î Dn, if f(a) = f(b) and, for all i Î N, gi - di = ai - bi then f(g) = f(d).
A3 can be viewed as a condition trying to reduce the complexity of the merging function.
The motivation is as follows. Suppose that f yields the same value under two different
measurement profiles a and b. This fact can be interpreted in the sense that f neutralizes (or
considers irrelevant) the changes in passing from a to b. By A3, if this happened once then
it happens always: by applying the same absolute changes to any g in order to obtain a new
profile d, the effects on the resulting merged value are innocuous, so that f(d) = f(g).
A3 bears some resemblance to the independence type conditions in social choice theory,
such as the condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives in Arrow’s (1963, p. 97)
theorem. According to this sort of assumptions, the aggregation of several items is carried
out by combining the aggregation of parts of those items. Independence then refers to the
fact that the aggregation of one of the parts does not depend on the aggregation of the other
parts. In this sense, A3 makes the effect on f of a change in the measurements independent
of the initial measurements: if given a measurement profile a, f(a) itself is the result of
increasing x units one of the measurements while decreasing y units another measurement,
with the rest of measurements held constant, then the same changes leave the value of f
unaltered no matter the initial profile a considered.
A3 is arguably not an uncontroversial requirement. It is nonetheless worth noticing that the
arithmetic mean satisfies A3, as well as A1 and A2. In this respect, the main result in this
section provides an answer to the question of what type of merging functions is consistent
with A1, A2 and A3 on discrete and closed domains.
Lemma 2.1 states that the value of a merging function satisfying A1 and A2 at profile a is
bounded above by the maximum of the values in a and bounded below by the minimum of
these values.
Lemma 2.1. If f : Dn ® D satisfies A1 and A2 then, for all a Î Dn, min{a1, … , an} £ f(a)
£ max{a1, … , an}.
Proof. Let a Î Dn, x := max{a1, … , an} and y := min{a1, … , an}. If f(a) = z > x then, by
A2, f(x, … , x) ³ z, whereas, by A1, f(x, … , x) = x: contradiction. If f(a) < y then, by A1,
f(y, … , y) = y and, given this, by A2, f(a) ³ y: contradiction.
￿-6-
Lemma 2.2 shows that, for merging functions satisfying A1, A2 and A3, there is a situation
in which f disregards all but one of the measurements. In particular, by interpreting N as a
set of individuals, Lemma 2.2 holds that f attributes some individual i the power to impose
some assessment x when the rest of individuals declare as assessment the smallest value
larger than x.
Lemma 2.2. If f : Dn ® D satisfies A1, A2 and A3 then there are i Î N, x Î D and y Î
D\{x} such that y covers x and f(xi, y-i) = x.
Proof. Suppose not: for all i Î N, x Î D and y Î D\{x}, if y covers x then f(xi, y-i) ¹ x. By
Lemma 2.1,
for all i Î N, x Î D and y Î D\{x}, if y covers x then f(xi, y-i) = y.     (1)
Choose i Î N, x Î D and y Î D\{x} such that y covers x. By (1), f(xi, y-i) = y. By A1, f(xi,
y-i) = f(yi, y-i). Consequently, by A3,
for all k Î N, a Î Dn and b Î Dn, if bk covers ak
and, for all j Î N\{k}, bj = aj then f(a) = f(b).            (2)
Taking f(xi, y-i) = f(yi, y-i) as the base of an induction argument, choose G Ì N with i Î G
and assume that f(xG, y-G) = f(yi, y-i). Let j Î N\G. By (2), f(xGÈ{j}, y-(GÈ{j})) = f(yG, y-G).
Since, by A1, f(yG, y-G) = y it follows that, for all non-empty G Ì N and j Î N\G, f(xG, y-G)
= y implies f(xGÈ{j}, y-(GÈ{j})) = y. Accordingly, by starting with f(xi, y-i) = y and
successively adding members of N to {i}, there is some k Î N such that f(x-k, yk) = y, which
contradicts (1).
￿
Lemma 2.3 establishes that, for merging functions satisfying A1, A2 and A3, the power
attributed to the individual in Lemma 2.2 in the specific case there defined cannot be shared
with other individuals.
Lemma 2.3. Let f : Dn ® D satisfy A1, A2 and A3. If there are i Î N, x Î D and y Î D\{x}
such that y covers x and f(xi, y-i) = x then, for all j Î N\{i}, f(xj, y-j) = y.
Proof. Suppose there are i Î N, j Î N\{i}, x Î D and y Î D\{x} such that y covers x and
f(xi, y-i) = x = f(xj, y-j). Case 1: some z Î D covers y. By A1, f(xj, y-j) = x yields f(xj, y-j) =-7-
f(xj, x-j). By A3, for all a Î Dn and b Î Dn, if bj = aj and, for all k Î N\{j}, bk covers ak
then f(a) = f(b). Given this, it follows from f(xi, y-i) = x = f(xi, x-i) that f(y{i,j}, z-{i,j}) = f(xi,
x-i), where z covers y. By A1, f(y{i,j}, z-{i,j}) = x < min{y, z}, contradicting Lemma 2.1.
Case 2: no z Î D covers y. Since f(xi, y-i) = x = f(xj, y-j), by A1 and A3, f(vi, x-i) = v = f(vj,
x-j), where x covers v. Given that y covers x, case 1 applies, so that f(vi, x-i) = v implies f(vj,
x-j) ¹ v. Hence, by A3, f(xi, y-i) = x implies f(xj, y-j) ¹ x: contradiction.
￿
Proposition 2.4. Merging function f : Dn ® D satisfies A1, A2 and A3 if, and only if, there
exists i Î N such that, for all x Î Dn, f(x) = xi.
Proof. “Þ” By Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3, there is i Î N such that, for all j Î N\{i}, if y covers x
then f(xj, y-j) = y. Therefore, by A3,
for all j Î N\{i}, x Î Dn and z Î D, if xj covers z then f(zj, x-j) = f(x).       (3)
To show that, for all a Î Dn, f(a) = ai let x = ai. Define J = {j Î N\{i}: aj > x} and K = {k
Î N\{i}: ak < x}. Choose first any j Î J and let (x1, … , xr) be the sequence of members of
D such that x1 = x, xr = aj and xt is covered by xt+1, for t Î {1, … , r – 1}. By A1, f(x, … ,
x) = x and, by successive application of (3), x = f((x1)j, x-j) = f((x2)j, x-j) = … = f((xr)j, x-j).
Applying the same reasoning to the rest of members of J, it follows that f(b) = x, where, for
all j Î J, bj = aj and, for all j Î N\J, bj = x. Proceeding in a similar vein with the members
of K, choose k Î K and let (y1, … , ys) be the sequence of members of D such that y1 = x, ys
= ak and yt covers yt+1, for t Î {1, … , s – 1}. Given f(b) = x, by successive application of
(3), x = f((y1)k, b-k) = f((y2)k, b-k) = … = f((ys)k, b-k). Applying the same reasoning to the
rest of members of K, it follows that f(a) = x. “Ü” If, for some i Î N and all x Î Dn, f(x) =
xi then it is easy to verify that f satisfies A1, A2 and A3.
￿
By Proposition 2.4, the only merging functions satisfying A1, A2 and A3 are projection
functions. In the social choice literature, such functions are called “dictatorial”, as one of
the individuals completely determines the outcome of the merging procedure. In terms of
measurements, imposing A1, A2 and A3 on a merging function f amounts to simplifying
extraordinarily the way f operates: the synthesizing value is always one given entry of the
measurement profile.
Remark 2.5. No condition in the set {A1, A2, A3} is redundant in Proposition 2.4. First,
the non-dictatorial f : Dn ® D such that, for some x Î D and all a Î Dn, f(a) = x satisfies-8-
A2 and A3 but not A1. Second, with D = {1, 2, 3}, the non-dictatorial f : D ´ D ® D such
that f(1, 1) = f(2, 3) = f(3, 2) = 1, f(2, 2) = f(1, 3) = f(3, 1) = 2 and f(3, 3) = f(1, 2) = f(2, 1) =
3 satisfies A1 and A3 but not A2. And third, the non-dictatorial f : Dn ® D such that, for all
a Î Dn, f(a) = max{a1, … , an} satisfies A1 and A2 but not A3.
Remark 2.6. As the proofs of Lemmas 2.3 and 2.4 make evident, Proposition 2.4 holds if
A3 is replaced by the weaker condition A3'.
A3'. If f(a) = f(b) and N = {i Î N: ai = bi} È {i Î N: ai covers bi} then f(d) = f(g) provided
{i Î N: di = gi} = {i Î N: ai = bi} and {i Î N: di covers gi} = {i Î N: ai covers bi}.
Remark 2.7. Proposition 2.4 holds if A3 is replaced by A3'', since A3'' implies A3'.
A3''. If f(a) = f(b) and, for all i Î N, di - gi £ ai - bi then f(d) £ f(g).
3. Merging interdependent measurements of several objects
In some cases, the aggregate measurement of the property of some object may depend on
the measurements of other objects. As an illustration, consider the situation in which n
individuals report utility values associated with a set of m public projects and a procedure F
must determine the collective value of each project on the basis of the reported utility
values. In this case, the input of F consists of an m ´ n matrix of entries xij representing the
utility individual i ascribes to project j, whereas the output is a vector whose m entries
represent the collective value attributed to each project. For this problem, the procedure
could just decentralize the aggregation by resorting to m merging functions f1, … , fm, so
that fj takes row j of the matrix and yields the jth entry of the vector of collective values.
In could nonetheless be that the m merging functions are subject to some form of
interdependence. For example, suppose that, instead of declaring utility values, individuals
reveal how they prefer a given amount c of money to be allocated among the m projects.
Thus, the columns of the matrix as well as the output vector must all add up to c. In
consequence, the merging functions fj cannot be freely chosen. In general, a situation like
this would arise when measurements are expressed as proportions and the aggregate values
must also be proportions. The aim of this section is to determine the extent to which such
problems can be handled by several merging functions acting simultaneously.-9-
Let N = {1, … , n} and M = {1, … , m} be finite subsets of the set of natural number, with
n ³ 2 and m ³ 3. For some natural number c, define D = {0, 1, … , c}. Members of Dm´n
can be viewed as matrices, so that, for k Î M and i Î N, xk is the kth row, xi is the ith
column and xik is the value simultaneously in the kth row and the ith column. With E = {x
Î Dm´n: for all i Î N, xi1 + … + xim = c}, a merging* function is a mapping F : E ® Dm
satisfying B0. For k Î M, merging* function F induces m functions Fk : E ® D such that,
for all x Î E, Fk(x) is the kth value in m-tuple F(x).
B0. For all x Î E, the sum of the values in F(x) is c; that is, F1(x) + … + Fm(x) = c.
The interpretation is as follows: (i) members of M designate the objects assigned score; (ii)
n is the number of scores associated with each object (each member of N could be viewed
as an individual reporting the scores he associates with each object); (iii) D collects the
possible scores, which range from 0 to a maximum score of c; (iv) each multidimensional
score xi is such that the sum of the scores of all the m objects must add up to c; and (v) f
represents a procedure to obtain a representative score Fk(x) for each object k Î M.
To clarify the notation, let c = 100, m = 4 and n = 3. Let x be the member of E in which the
first score profile is (50, 5, 20, 25), so 50 is the first score of the first object, 5 the first score
of the second object, and so on. That is, x1 = (50, 5, 20, 25) and this constitutes the first
column of the matrix x. If x is such that x2 = (30, 15, 20, 35) and x3 = (0, 100, 0, 0) then x1
= (50, 30, 0) is the first row of the matrix x and determines the set of scores that the first
object receives. Similarly, x2 = (5, 15, 100), x3 = (20, 20, 0) and x4 = (25, 35, 0) define the
scores that receive, respectively, objects 2, 3 and 4. Finally, that x32 = 100 expresses the
fact that object 2 receives score 100 in the third scoring profile. This section is concerned
with the following question: what merging* functions F are consistent, in the sense of B1,
with the use of merging functions?
B1. For every k Î M there is a merging function fk : Dn ® D such that Fk(x) = fk(xk).
By B1, merging* function F defines a separable procedure by means of which, for each
object k Î M, a merging function fk determines the score of that object taking into account
only the scores of that object. To a certain extent, B1 expresses the aim of reducing
merging* functions to merging functions.
B2. For all k Î M and x Î E, Fk(x) £ max{x1k, … , xnk}.-10-
B2 can be interpreted as a sort of “capacity constraint”: the summarizing score of an object
cannot be larger than the maximum of the scores the object receives. The main result in this
section asserts that merging* functions satisfying B1 and B2 must be projection functions
and, accordingly, the summarizing profile of scores always coincides with a fixed column
of scores. If members of N represent individuals and, hence, xi defines how individual i
ascribes scores to the different objects, the main result states that the summarizing profile
of scores always coincides with the score profile of a given individual.
By B1, a merging* function F is decomposed into m merging functions fk. Lemma 3.1 next
asserts that, if B2 is assumed in addition to B1, the merging functions satisfy the agreement
property A1 from Section 2.
Lemma 3.1. If merging* function F : E ® D satisfies B1 and B2 then, for all k Î M and x
Î D, fk(x, … , x) = x.
Proof. Choose k Î M, q Î M\{k} and x Î D. Consider the member x of E such that xk = (x,
… , x), xq = (c - x, … , c - x) and, for all p Î M\{k, q}, xp = (0, … , 0). By B2, Fq(x) £ c -
x and, for all p Î M\{k, q}, Fp(x) = 0. Therefore, since F1(x) + … + Fm(x) = c, Fk(x) ³ x.
But, by B2, Fk(x) £ x and, consequently, Fk(x) = x. Thus, by B1, fk(xk) = x.
￿
For i Î N, x Î D, y Î D\{x} and G Í N: (i) as in Section 2, (xi, y-i) abbreviates the n-tuple
(z1, … , zn) such that, for all j Î N, zj = x if j = i and zj = y if j ¹ i; and (xG, y-G) abbreviates
the n-tuple (z1, … , zn) such that, for all j Î N, zj = x if j Î G and zj = y if j Î N\G.
Lemma 3.2 is a result similar to Lemma 2.2: interpreting N as a set of individuals, if
merging* function F satisfies B1 and B2 then there are some object k Î M and individual i
Î N such that, when all but i associate the lowest score 0 to the object and i associates the
second lowest score 1, the collective score coincides with i’s score.
Lemma 3.2. If merging* function F : E ® D satisfies B1 and B2 then there are i Î N and k
Î M such that fk(1i, 0-i) = 1.
Proof. Suppose not: for all i Î N and k Î M, fk(1i, 0-i) ¹ 1. By B2,
for all i Î N and k Î M, fk(1i, 0-i) = 0.      (4)-11-
Choose i Î N. Let x Î E be such that x1 = x2 = (1i, 0-i), x3 = ((c - 2)i, c-i) and, for all p Î
M\{1, 2, 3}, xp = (0, … , 0). Given B1, by B2, fp(xp) = 0 for all p Î M\{1, 2, 3}. By (4),
f1(x1) = f2(x2) = 0. Consequently, f3(x3) = c. Let z Î E differ from x only in that z1 = (0, …
0) and z2 = (2i, 0-i). As f3(x3) = c, it follows from B1 that f3(z3) = c. By B0, f2(z2) = 0.
Thus, given (4) and B2, f2(xi, 0-i) = 0 for all x Î {0, 1, 2}. Now, the aim is to show that,
for all x Î D, f2(xi, 0-i) = 0.         (5)
To that end, choose x Î D\{0, 1, 2} and, arguing inductively, suppose that, for all y Î {0, 1,
… , x - 1}, f2(yi, 0-i) = 0. It has to be shown that f2(xi, 0-i) = 0. With j Î E differing from x
only in that j2 = ((x - 1)i, 0-i) and j3 = ((c - x)i, c-i), it follows from B2 that, for all p Î
M\{1, 2, 3}, fp(jp) = 0. By (4), f1(j1) = 0. By the induction hypothesis, f2(j2) = 0. As a
result, by B0, f3(j3) = c. Let h Î E differ from j only in that h1 = (0, … 0) and h2 = (xi,
0-i). Since f3(j3) = c, by B1, f3(h3) = c. By B0, f2(h2) = 0 and (5) is proved. Taking f2(ci,
0-i) = 0 as the base of another induction argument, choose G Ì N containing i and assume
that f2(cG, 0-G) = 0. It will be shown that, for all j Î N\G, f2(cGÈ{j}, 0-(GÈ{j})) = 0. To this
end, let j Î N\G and m Î E differ from x only in that m1 = (cG, 0-G), m2 = (0GÈ{j}, c-(GÈ{j}))
and m3 = (cj, 0-j). By B2, for all p Î M\{1, 2, 3}, fp(mp) = 0. By the induction hypothesis,
f1(m1) = 0. By (5) and B1, f3(m3) = 0. By B0, f2(m2) = c, which is what has to be proved. In
view of this, there must be k Î N\{i} such that f2(ck, 0-k) = c, contradicting (5).
￿
Lemma 3.3 extends the result in Lemma 3.2 to any score that i could report.
Lemma 3.3. If merging* function F : E ® D satisfies B1 and B2, and there are i Î N, x Î
D and k Î M such that fk(xi, 0-i) = x then, for all k Î M, fk(xi, 0-i) = x.
Proof. Assume fk(xi, 0-i) = x. Let q Î M\{k}. To prove that fq(xi, 0-i) = x, choose p Î M\{k,
q} and let x Î E be such that xk = (xi, 0-i), xp = ((c - x)i, c-i) and, for all s Î M\{k, p}, xs =
(0, … , 0). By B2, fs(xs) = 0, for all s Î M\{k, p}. Since fk(xi, 0-i) = x, fk(xk) = x and, by B0,
fp(xp) = c - x. Given this and z Î E that differs from x only in that zk = (0i, 0-i) and zq = (xi,
0-i), it follows that fp(zp) = c - x and, for all s Î M\{p, q}, fs(zs) = 0. Thus, fq(xi, 0-i) = x.
￿
Lemma 3.4 extends the result in Lemma 3.3 to all the objects.
Lemma 3.4. If merging* function F : E ® D satisfies B1 and B2 then-12-
there is i Î N such that, for all k Î M and x Î D, fk(xi, 0-i) = x.  (6)
Proof. By B2, for all i Î N and k Î M, fk(0i, 0-i) = 0. By Lemma 3.2, there are i Î N and k
Î M such that fk(1i, 0-i) = 1. Choose x Î D\{0, 1} and, arguing inductively, suppose that,
for all y Î {0, 1, … , x - 1}, fk(yi, 0-i) = y. To prove that fk(xi, 0-i) = x, choose q Î M\{k}
and p Î M\{k, q}. Let x Î E satisfy: for all s Î M\{k, p, q}, xs = (0, … , 0); xp = (1i, 0-i); xk
= ((x - 1)i, 0-i); and xq = ((c - x)i, c-i). By B2, fs(xs) = 0, for all s Î M\{k, p, q}. By the
induction hypothesis, fk(xk) = x - 1. By the induction hypothesis and Lemma 3.3, fp(xp) = 1.
Thus, by B0, fq(xq) = c - x. Given this and z Î E that differs from x only in that zk = (xi,
0-i) and zp = (0i, 0-i), it follows that fq(zq) = c - x and, for all s Î M\{q, k}, fs(zs) = 0. By
B0, fk(xi, 0-i) = x. Consequently, there are i Î N and k Î M such that, for all x Î D, fk(xi,
0-i) = x. This and Lemma 3.3 imply (6).
￿
By Lemma 3.5, individual i in (6) can also impose the null score: for each object, whenever
i ascribes score 0 to that object, the collective score is also 0.
Lemma 3.5. If merging* function F : E ® D satisfies B1, B2 and (6) then, for all x Î E
and k Î M, xik = 0 implies fk(xk) = 0.
Proof. Let i be the member of N from (6). Suppose x Î E and k Î M are such that xik = 0.
With q Î M\{k} and p Î M\{k, q}, consider the z Î E satisfying: for all s Î M\{k, p, q}, zs
= (0, … , 0); zq = (ci, 0-i); zip = zik = 0; and, for all j Î N\{i}, zjp = c - xjk and zjk = xjk. By
(6), fq(zq) = c. By B0, this implies fk(zk) = 0 and this, by B1, fk(xk) = 0.
￿
Proposition 3.6. If merging* function F : E ® D satisfies B1 and B2 then F is dictatorial in
the sense that there exists i Î N such that, for all x Î E, F(x) = xi.
Proof. By Lemma 3.4, (6) holds. Let x Î E and k Î M. It must be shown that fk(xk) = xik.
Choose q Î M\{k}, p Î M\{k, q} and z Î E such that: zk = xk; for all s Î M\{k, q, p}, zs =
(0i, 0-i); zq = ((c - xik)i, 0-i); zip = 0; and, for all j Î N\{i}, zjp = c - xjk. By B2, fs(zs) = 0,
for all s Î M\{k, q, p}. By (6), fq(xq) = c - xik. By Lemma 3.5, fp(xp) = 0. Therefore, by B0,
fk(xk) = xik.
￿
Proposition 3.6 is a result analogous to Proposition 2.4 in that the merging* function is a
projection function. In the present case, the vector of collective scores always coincides
with one and the same vector of individual scores. In this respect, if members of N are-13-
regarded as experts providing their opinion as to how resources must be allocated or efforts
distributed, B1 and B2 amount to disregarding all but one of the experts.
Remark 3.7. No condition in the set {B0, B1, B2} is redundant in Proposition 3.6. First,
the non-dictatorial F : E ® D such that, for all k Î M and x Î E, Fk(x) = max{x1k, … , xnk}
satisfies B1 and B2 but not B0. Second, the non-dictatorial F : E ® D such that, for some i
Î N, some j Î N\{i}, some z Î E with zi ¹ zj, and all x Î E\{z}, F(x) = xi and F(z) = zj
satisfies B0 and B2 but not B1. And third, when c/m Î D, the non-dictatorial F : E ® D
such that, for all x Î E and k Î M, Fk(x) = c/m satisfies B0 and B1 but not B2.
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